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INTRODUCTION
While the situation in Syria is being referred to as "the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world," the United States continues a strong
stance against the War on Terror. The War on Terror has allowed the
United States to shape new immigration policy around its national
security, as permitted by the United Nations Protocol to the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention).2 The 1951
Convention provides a national security exception, which has also been
enshrined within the United States' domestic refugee law.3 The United
States has used this exception as a crutch to practice discrimination and
exclude certain applicants from admission into the United States, despite
the fact that many of these applicants satisfy the definition of a refugee.
While these laws dictate the procedures for determining whether a
refugee is admissible into the United States, with a strong adherence to
the national security clause, this report asserts that the United States uses
methods that not only violate several international conventions protecting
human rights, but that also violate its very own legal precedent. In the
war against terrorism, human rights must not be the first victim.4 Refugee
and asylum applicants deserve fair access to a fair process, and there are
some rights upon which the government must never infringe.
Part I of this article will provide background on the circumstances
surrounding the current situation in Syria and its effect on refugees as a
whole. Part II will analyze the likelihood that Syrian and Iraqi refugees
fall within the international and U.S. domestic definition of refugee. Part
III will discuss the lengthy and stringent screening process that each
refugee must endure to obtain refugee status or asylum for admission
into the United States, as well as the requirement that the United States
abide by international conventions that require non-discriminatory
practices in determining refugee status. Part IV will discuss the United
States' interpretation of the national security exception in relation to
immigration, as well as an abuse of discretion among immigration
officers. Part V will demonstrate that despite satisfaction of the definition
of a refugee, discriminatory practices are present in determining
I Robert Golan-Vilella, America is Never (Ever, Ever) Ending the War on Terror,
NAT'L INTEREST (Apr. 27, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-never-ever-
ever-ending-the-war-terror- 12744.
2 Victoria Rapport, Note, The Politicization Of United States Asylum And Refugee
Policies, 11 SCHOLAR 195 (2009).
3 See Generally Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
4 Geoff Gilbert, Soapbox: Human Rights Have to Remain Sacrosanct, TIMES HIGHER
ED. (Oct. 12, 2001), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/soapbox-human-rights-
have-to-remain-sacrosanct/165318.article.
5 Id.
2015-16] 63
64 U MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV
admission because the national security exception cannot plausibly apply
in all cases referred to the United States. Finally, Part VI of the report
will propose that the United States adopt a different approach. Rather
than continue a discriminatory process in violation of U.S. and
international law, the U.S. should instead open its borders to refugees
without discrimination. Perhaps by returning to a foreign policy-based
admission of refugees, the United States still stand firmly against the
War on Terror with an alternative, effective, and non-aggressive strategy.
PART I: RISE OF THE SYRIAN EXODUS
Islam's two major branches, Shiism and Sunnism, have, more often
than not, co-existed peacefully over the centuries.6 Syria is one of the
only two countries in the Middle East with a Shiite minority ruling over a
Sunni majority.7 In the political vacuum that ensued after the Iraq War
and gained stamina from the Arab Spring, sectarian divisions intensified,
which led the Sunni opposition to take up arms against a 42-year long
dynasty of the Shiite-led government in Syria.' Since then, the battle has
disintegrated into an even more lethal sectarian conflict with a heavy
civilian death toll.9 The Civil War among the Sunni rebels and Shiite
government paved the way for the Islamic State terrorist organization.'o
Capitalizing on the chaos in the region, the prot6g6 of al-Qaeda took
control of a large swath of territory across northern and eastern Syria, as
well as parts of Iraq." Many foreign fighters in Syria are now involved
in this "war within a war," battling rebels and jihadists from the elite al-
Qaeda inspired front.12
Since the beginning of the conflict, more than four million Syrians
have registered as refugees. However, some estimate that there are more
than 10.6 million Syrians who have been displaced since the inception of
the conflict.' 3 In fact, this conflict has created one of the largest refugee
exoduses in recent history.1 4 Neighboring countries have bome the brunt
Leda Hartman, Islamic Sectarianism, 6 CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER 353, 355 (2012).
Id. at 355.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 368.
to Lucy Rodgers et al., Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
I Id.
12 Id.
13 Mark Bixler & Michael Martinez, War Has Forced Half of Syrians From Their
Homes. Here's Where They've Gone, CNN (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015
/09/11 /world/syria-refugee-crisis-when-war-displaces-half-a-country/.
14 Rodgers, supra note 10.
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of this refugee crisis, with Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey struggling to
accommodate the flood of new arrivals.' 5 As conditions in Syria continue
to deteriorate, the refugee exodus only increases. These refugees
originally abandoned their homes while fleeing persecution from the
Shiite backed government led by President Bashar al-Assad, who
implemented a violent crackdown of insurgents and alleged supporters of
the rebellion.1 6 According to reporters in the region, every refugee
recounted knowing of a fellow national who returned to Syria only to be
arrested or shot.' 7 Once the refugees flee their homes, the al-Assad forces
tag them as insurgents, and therefore most Syrians who remain in Turkey
and Lebanon are sure "a terrible fate awaits anyone who returns."
In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS) took control of
a prominent Iraqi city and incited a new refugee crisis in the Middle
East.1 9 That same year, IS fighters attacked Kurdish villages along the
Syrian-Turkish border and sparked a massive refugee migration. 20 Many
of the refugees who hoped for a dying battle fled to the countryside in
fear of the new jihadist movement.2 ' More than 130,000 Syrian Kurds
fled the jihadi in late September 2014, which prompted the greatest
refugee flow since the start of the Syrian Civil War.22
Before this civil war, the al-Assad regime protected other minorities,
including Christians and a minority sect of the Muslim religion, Druze.23
These minorities originally feared government persecution from the
Sunni sect. Unfortunately, refugees of all religions, whether Muslim or
Christian, now fear (in addition to government persecution) the IS "near
enemy" strategy, albeit on a regional level.24 IS has declared its
mission-inspired by strict right-wing ideology-to create a pure Sunni
Islamic state governed by a brutal interpretation of sharia law.25 The
Islamic State, unlike al-Qaeda, targets not the United States, but rather
15 Id.
16 Liam Stack, For Refugees From Syria, a Visit With No Expiration Date, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/world/middleeast/refugees-from-
syria-settle-in-for-long-wait-in-turkey.html?pagewanted~all&_r-1.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis-in the Middle East and Europe,
MIGRATION POLICY CTR. (last visited Apr. 09, 2016), http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page
id=163.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Hartman, supra note 6. at 355.
24 Daniel L. Byman, Comparing al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different
Targets, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony
/2015/04/29-terrorism-in-africa-byman.
25 See id.
2015-16] 65
66 U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV
what they consider defector regimes in the Arab world.26 These apostate
regimes are believed to have defected from the ultra-conservative form
of Sunnism because they are known to practice a modernist interpretation
of the Qu'ran.27 The leaders of IS have declared their conquered territory
to be part of a Sunni Muslim caliphate, and they seek to purify the land
by attacking all Shiite and other religious minorities. 28 This attempt at
"purification" has resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing
the area every day, many attempting the dangerous trip across the
Mediterranean. These refugees are looking for a better future, far away
*29from discriminatory persecution.
PART II: SATISFYING THE DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE
It is particularly important to understand the criteria international law
expects member states to follow when determining the status of refugees.
The United Nations created the 1951 Convention to ensure member
states preserve the status of refugees. The 1951 Convention endorses a
single definition of "refugee" as "someone who is unable or unwilling to
return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion."30 The 1951 Convention also
includes an important non-discrimination clause, which requires member
states to "apply the provisions of [the] Convention to refugees without
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin." 3' The Handbook
and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status further identifies the suggested standards in establishing refugee
32
status. In interpreting the definition, the Handbook defines "agents of
persecution" to mean an action by the authorities of a country.33 It also
26 Id.
27 Hartman, supra note 6, at 360.
28 See Byman, supra note 24.
29 Quick Facts: What You Need to Know About the Syria Crisis, MERCYCORPS (Sept.
2, 2015), https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-
facts-what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis.
30 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 429(V)
(hereinafter G.A. Res. 429(v)), U.N. Doc. A/1775/48 (last visited Dec. 14, 2015),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.html.
31 G.A. Res. 429(V), supra note 30, at art. 3.
32 See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK AND
GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER
THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING To THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES [Hereinafter UNHCR] (last visited Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org
/3d58el3b4.html.
33 Id. at 15.
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accepts that persecution may stem from sections of the population that do
not respect the laws of the country concerned.3 4 Persecution for reasons
of religion may assume various forms, and broadly includes serious
measures of discrimination imposed on individuals because they practice
their religion or simply belong to or identify with a particular religious
community.3 5 Mere membership in a particular religious community will
normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status.3 6
However, there are circumstances where membership in a group does
suffice to satisfy the requirement.3 7 In these circumstances, satisfaction
of the definition of refugee will primarily require an evaluation of the
applicant's statements, rather than judgment on the situation prevailing in
his or her country of origin.38 The burden of proof is upon the individual
submitting a claim to substantiate membership and future fear, though
due to abnormal circumstances many times facing the individual's
country of origin, there may be statements that are not susceptible to
proof.3 9 In these cases, the Handbook recommends that, unless there are
good reasons to the contrary, the individual should be given the benefit
of the doubt.40
The United States has its own legislation and policies regarding the
definition of refugee.4 ' The United States adopted the language of the
1951 Convention in its 1980 Refugee Act.42 This legislation and policy is
regulated through the Immigration and Nationality Act.43 The United
States, as a party to the Convention and its Protocol, must adopt policies
in compliance with these international obligations.44 Accordingly, the
Handbook accedes to the Contracting State an ability to establish a
procedure that it considers most appropriate, taking into account its
particular constitutional and administrative structure.4 5 Therefore, the
United States has interpreted "refugee" to mean that an applicant must
qualify under one of the protected groups enumerated in the statute, and
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 16.
37 Id. at 25.
38 Id. at 11.
39 Id. at 38.
40 Id. at 39.
41 See generally Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (amending
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 to allow for refugee admission and
resettlement in United States).
42 See Id.
43 Id.
44 Convention, supra note 30, at 46.
45 Id. at 37.
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connect that membership to a well-founded fear of persecution.4 6
Mirrored after the 1951 Convention, 4 7 to satisfy this test under Section
1101 (a)(42) an individual must show that he or she has a well-founded
fear of persecution, which requires either (1) a showing of past
persecution or (2) independent proof of a well-founded fear of future
persecution. 48 Either route requires that the applicant forge a link
between the harm asserted and some governmental act or omission.4 9 In
the form of terrorist activities, the necessary governmental connection
may manifest itself in the execution of the persecuting acts themselves,
in the condemnation of those acts, or in the failure to prevent them.50
Persecution under U.S. interpretation conforms to the 1951
Convention interpretation and is defined as "an infliction or threat of
death, torture, or injury to one's person or freedom on account of a
protected factor such as religion or membership in an ethnic group."5 To
satisfy the definition of "fear of well-founded persecution," an individual
must prove that he or she has a subjective and objective fear. The
objective component requires credible, direct, and specific evidence of
facts that would support an individual having a reasonable fear of
persecution.52 In fact, "under certain conditions, they can be
dispositive." 53 An applicant may satisfy the subjective component by
producing credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears
persecution..5 In regard to those abnormal circumstances anticipated by
the 1951 Convention, where statements may not be susceptible to proof,
the Supreme Court has further held that "so long as an objective situation
is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will
probably result in persecution; it is enough that persecution is a
reasonable possibility." 5 Further, 8 C.F.R. Section 1208.13 provides that
an applicant demonstrates a subjective, well-founded fear of persecution
by establishing that there is a "pattern or practice in his or her country of
nationality of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the
applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, and the applicant establishes
his or her own inclusion in, and identification with such group of persons
46 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2013).
47 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S 421, 429 (1987).
48 Harutyunyan v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
49 Id. at 67.
50 Id. at 68..
51 Yang v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 2005); See also HANDBOOK, supra
note 32, at 13.
52 Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1988).
53 Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 341 (9th Cir. 1994).
54 Id.
5 See generally Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
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such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable." 5 6
Recent cases emphasize "the idea behind the 'pattern or practice'
exception to the individualized proof requirement is that where the
persecution of a group on the basis of a protected ground is sufficiently
widespread, a 'reasonable possibility' of persecution is evident and
evidence of individualized targeting becomes unnecessary." In these
cases, it is likely that mere membership in a particular group will satisfy
the requirement if reasonable possibility of persecution is proven.
Finally, the individual must demonstrate that he or she is unable to avail
him or herself to the protection of his or her government within the
native country.
Accordingly, the Syrian refugees, while required to present facts
relevant to their particular situations regarding persecution, potentially
fall within the necessary categories to be considered for admission into
the United States and avail themselves of its protection. Syria is in the
midst of a civil war, and there is no government to which these refugees
can count on for protection. In addition, the Islamic State has created a
de facto government within the territory. 5 9 These individuals suffer
persecution by both govermment forces and terrorist groups, on the basis
of a religious belief, while being unable to receive the protection of any
* * 60government in their country of origin. Under these circumstances, these
individuals appear to satisfy the definition of refugee both internationally
and within the United States.6 '
PART III: FROM THEN To Now: SCREENING, VETTING, AND
STOPPING THE ADMISSION OF REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES
WITH AN ADVISABLE ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
According to the 1951 Convention, "A person is a refugee as soon as
he fulfills the criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily
occur prior to the time that his refugee status is formally determined.
56 8 C.F.R. 1208.13(b)(2)(C)(iii)(A); see also 8 CFR 1208.13(b)(2)(C)(iii)(B).
5 Michael D. Yanovsky Sukenik, Marginal Refugee: The Ramifications of Terrorism
for an Unsustainable United states Asylum Policy, 65 U. MIAMI L. REv. 79 (2010); see
also Vakeesan v. Holder, 343 F. App'x 126 (6th Cir. 2009) (An alien may prevail on his
asylum claim even without credible evidence that he is likely to be singled out for
persecution if he can establish a pattern or practice of persecution).
Harutyunyan, 421 F.3d at 67.
59 Zachary Laub, The Islamic State, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/pl4811.
60 Id.
61 See Convention, supra note 30.
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Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee
but declares him to be one." 62 As established within the 1980 Refugee
Act, "merely because an individual or group of refugees comes within
the definition [of a refugee] will not guarantee resettlement in the United
States." 63 After an individual satisfies the definition of a refugee, he or
she must then be assessed within a new established set of procedures for
admission into the United States.
The War on Terror permits the United States to modify its
* 64immigration policies around its national security concerns. These
modifications are subject to the 1951 Convention and other obligations
under International Law. The principles of equality and non-
discrimination are both integral to international human rights law and
crucial for effectively countering terrorism.6 5 By the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article IV, "limitations
imposed for the protection of national security must be necessary to avert
a real and imminent-not just hypothetical-danger to the existence of
the nation, its territorial integrity or political independence." 66 It follows
that in times of public emergency, where the life of the nation is
threatened, a national security exception is permitted. However, the
parties to the ICCPR, including the United States, must not derogate
rights that would involve discrimination to race, religion, or social
origin.67 Additionally, the United States is a party to the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which stipulates that member
states must ensure that any measures taken against terrorism do not
discriminate on the grounds of race, descent, national, or ethnic origins.6 8
The U.S. approach to refugee admissions has been an issue for
decades, dating back to the Cold War era.6 9 The United States derogated
the rights of non-citizens based on race and national origin in order to
62 UNHCR, supra note 32, at 9.
63 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 444.
64 Rapport, supra note 2, at 211.
65 UNITED NATIONS COUNTER-TERRORISM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE, BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE GUIDE: SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE (Mar. 2014) [Hereinafter
UNCTITF], available at http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitfpdfs/Basic%/`20Human
%20Rights%20Reference%20-%20Security%20Infrastructure20l4.
66 Id. at 6.
67 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2 opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%/`20999/volume-999-1-14668-
English.pdf.
68 UNCTITF, supra note 65, at 8.
69 See Samia A. Malik, Student Article, Protecting the Persecuted and Fulfilling the
True Goals of a War on Terror Through Immigration, 2 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L REv. 333, 344
(2005).
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protect the nation from communism. 70 The government focused its
efforts on admitting refugees from communist-dominated nations as part
of a campaign of "psychological warfare" against the Soviet Union and
its leadership. 7 ' The purpose was to advance U.S. foreign policy
objectives in a manner that would validate communist based countries'
government failures.72 Thereby, in granting asylum to refugees fleeing
communist states, the U.S. would demonstrate that such states were
oppressive persecutors and further the appeal of democracy and
capitalism as superior systems of government,7 3 while admonishing
communist ideology. 74
The policy used during the Cold War to advance the position of the
United States was abolished with the implementation of the 1980
Refugee Act. The Refugee Act mirrored the 1951 Convention and
considered a policy-neutral, humanitarian-based refugee policy. 7 6 That is,
of course, until the attack on September 11, 2001, which began the War
on Terror. Lack of interagency sharing led the government to enhance its
screening by implementing strict policies targeted specifically at
applicants from al-Qaeda based Middle Eastern nations.7  This strategy
was a result of many vulnerabilities of the screening, one of which
permitted the admittance of two Iraqi nationals who pled guilty in 2011
to providing material support to al-Qaeda.7 ' The interagency checks used
at the time returned no red flags on the two individuals, while
information regarding one of the individuals' fingerprints on a roadside
bomb sat in a Department of Defense database.79
Since then, the process for vetting Iraqi nationals has become even
more stringent; it has also been expanded to members of other
nationalities. The process begins with the United Nations High
70 Id.
71 Sukenik, supra note 57, at 103.
72 Id. at 102-03.
73 Id.
74 Andrew Brower, Note, Asylum and The American Spirit: The Shift From Foreign
Policy-Based Bias In Favor OfApplicants From Enemy Countries To A Domestic Policy-
Based Bias Against Applicants From "High Risk" Countries, 7 ELON L. REv. 571, 575
(2015).
7 See generally Id.
76 Id.
n See generally Terrorist Exploitation of Refugee Programs: Hearing Before the H
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Committee of Homeland Security,
112th Cong., (2012) (statement of Lawrence Barlett, Director of Office of Refugee
Admissions, Barbara Strack, Chief Refugee Affairs Division, United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services, and Dawn Scalici, accompanying from U.S. Department of
Homeland Security).
78 Id.
79 Hearing, supra note 77, at 17.
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office identifying and referring
individuals who fit the definition of refugee to the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program (USRAP) for screening.s In coordination with the
UNHCR, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) specially
trained officers travel around the world to conduct detailed in-person
interviews with refugee applicants." These officers have been trained for
the specific populations that they will be interviewing, with detailed
country of origin information and fraud trends or security issues that may
have been identified in that region.8 2 The USCIS officers, when
conducting interviews of Syrian refugees in particular, undergo a one-
week training to focus on "Syria-specific topics."83 The line of
questioning involves whether the applicant has been involved in terrorist
activity, criminal activity, or the persecution/torture of others; the officer
also conducts a credibility assessment.8 4
The screening of refugee applicants involves numerous biographical
checks initiated by the U.S. led Resettlement Support Centers (RSC).
These include name checks for all refugee applicants, (both primary
names and variations of the name), which are conducted by the State
Department. 8 6 The system contains records from numerous agencies and
includes information on individuals who have been denied visas, who
have immigration violations, who possess criminal histories, and who
generate terrorism concerns. The system also contains intelligence
information and child support enforcement data. 7 The USCIS continues
such biographical checks with fingerprint equipment screened against the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Defense (DOD),
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) databases. Certain
biographical and fingerprint tests were developed for certain cases,
particularly in relation to individuals originating from the Middle East.8 9
The purpose of establishing a relationship with the DOD was to obtain
records from those individuals captured in Iraq and elsewhere. 90 In 2008,
a special biographic check for Iraqi applicants was developed to expand
the screening process to include data from individuals who had been
so Refugee Processing and Security Screening, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (last visited
Apr. 09, 2016), http://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening.
81 Id
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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detained or employed by U.S. forces.9 ' The process is applied to all
refugees seeking admission into the United States; however, the DHS has
recognized that the discriminating factor lies within the types of checks
that are applied to refugees of particular nationalities. 92
For example, the USCIS provides an enhanced review of certain
Syrian cases believed to present a national security threat. 9 3 Additionally,
the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) checks certain applicants in a
more rigorous examination. 94 The State Department initiates the SAO for
certain refugee applicants whom they identify as members of a group or
nationality designated to require a higher security check. 95 In light of
possible motivations of terrorist organizations to identify vulnerabilities
in the screening procedure, the government has led a strictly intelligence
driven process.96 The DHS in particular, in conjunction with interagency
partners, actively seeks to identify means by which terrorist
organizations may try to "penetrate [U.S.] defenses" and identify groups
of concern that really require increased screening and detention.9 7
Following this stringent screening developed to combat terrorist
infiltration of the refugee program, Congress has put forward the
American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015 (American
SAFE Act). 98 The act proposes a shut down of the resettlement program,
which would halt admission to the U.S. from Syrian and Iraqi applicants
altogether.99 This pause on admission would continue until further
investigation and review can be conducted to ensure that there is no
security risk.' 00 These additional screenings would be placed specifically
upon individuals who are nationals or residents of Iraq or Syria and those
who have been present in Iraq or Syria after March of 2011.101 In its
proposal to the House, Representative Goodlatte emphasized that "the
current vetting process cannot prevent [an IS operative] from receiving
refugee status."1 0 2 He promoted the bill by presenting FBI Director
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Hearing, supra note 77, at 30.
97 Id.
98 American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015, H.R. 4038, 114th Cong.
(2015).
99 Deirdre Walsh & Ted Barrett, House Passes Bill That Could Limit Syrian Refugees,
CNN (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/19/politics/house-democrats-refugee
-hearings -obama/.
100 Id.
101 Hearing, supra note 77.
102 Id. (Statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
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James Comey's comments: "with a conflict zone like Syria, where there
is 'dramatically' less information available to use during the vetting
process, he could not 'offer anybody an absolute assurance that there is
no risk associated with' admitting Syrian nationals as refugees."1 0 3 The
bill would require the DHS Secretary, FBI Director, and Director of
National Intelligence certify Congress that each refugee is not a security
threat prior to his or her admission to the United States.1 04 Countering,
Representative Conyers asserts, "[t]his measure sets unreasonable
clearance standards that the DHS simply cannot meet."1o' He continues,
"[it] is an extreme over-reaction to these latest security concerns." 06
"Instead of slamming our doors to the world's most vulnerable, we
should be considering legislation to strengthen and expand refugee
programs." 0 7
Refugee resettlement into the United States has been relatively
secure. The preemptive and reactionary measures by interagency
cooperation have ensured that U.S. citizens and national security remain
a top priority. However, perhaps it is these stringent security measures
that lead to the U.S. government's inability to resettle thousands of
refugees who qualify under the domestic definition.'s Representative
McCaul provided that in the homeland the FBI has investigated nearly
1,000 IS-related individuals in all 50 States,1 09 yet provided no evidence
of "plots" regarding the infiltration of refugees by IS into the United
States specifically using the resettlement program. However, it is
evidenced by the substantial decrease in refugee admittance to the United
States that the U.S. government's resettlement officials adhere to these
same fears. From January 2013 through December 2015, the United
States has processed and resettled 2,365 Syrian refugees." 0 Yet from
2007 to 2013, over 88,000 Iraqi nationals had been resettled in the
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. (Statement by Rep. Conyers).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Kevin Walsh, Note, Victims OfA Growing Crisis: A Call For Reform Of The United
States Immigration Law And Policy Pertaining To Refugees Of The Iraq, 53 VILL. L.
REv. 421, 455 (2008).
109 161 CONG. REC. 171, H8381 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2015).
110 Admissions and Arrivals, REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR. (last visited Apr. 10, 2016),
http://www.wrapsnet.org/Reports/InteractiveReporting/tabid/393/E.
numType/Report/Default.aspx?ItemPath=/rptWebArrivalsReports/Map%20%20Arrival
s%20by%20State%20and%20Nationality (statistics of Syrian refugees accepted from
2013 to 2015).
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United States."' Perhaps it was the United States' moral obligation to
implement a refugee admissions program that included the refugees it
created in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of the post-September 11 U.S.
led wars. In contrast, the United States took no military part in creating
the Syrian refugees, and thereby arguably lacks a moral obligation to the
refugees and instead feels justified in continuing a discriminatory
screening process hidden behind national security concerns.
PART IV: INELIGIBILITY ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
A. Defining the National Security Exception Used to Disqualify
Refugees
Under the definition in the 1980 Refugee Act, every asylum-seeker is
also a refugee.11 2 Overseas refugees differ from asylum-seekers because
they have not yet reached the United States but can nevertheless qualify
for refugee status.'13 While there is a factual distinction between the two
definitions, both seek admission into the United States based on a well-
founded fear of persecution.114 There is no appeal for a denial of an
application for refugee status for those applying overseas, therefore it is
difficult to determine the precise standard used by United States officers
when qualifying admissibility." 5 However, because under the 1980
Refugee Act every asylum-seeker is also a refugee and must satisfy the
requirements of a refugee, the precedent under U.S. law for denying
admission of a refugee on the basis of national security applied to
asylum-seekers similarly applies to refugees seeking admission from
outside of the United States.
11 Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2014: Report to Congress: Submitted
on Behalf of the President of the United States to the Committees on the Judiciary United
States Senate and House of Representatives, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (last visited Apr. 20,
2016), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/219137.pdf.
112 Meital Waibsnaider, Note, How National Self-Interest And Foreign Policy Continue
To Influence The US. Refugee Admissions Program, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 391, 392
(2006) (an asylum-seeker is eligible for asylum if the INS "determines that such alien is a
refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A)").
113 Id.
114 Refugees and Asylum, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (last visited Jun. 16, 2015),
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum (defining asylum-seeker and
refugee).
115 Request for Review Tip Sheet, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (last rev. Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/request-review-tip-sheet
(There is no appeal for a denial of an application for refugee status).
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It has been difficult ascertaining the U.S. interpretation of national
security.11 6 The 1951 Convention provides a national security exception
for states to limit admission of refugees." 7 The 1951 Convention permits
member states "in time of war or other grave and exceptional
circumstances [to take] certain actions that it believes are essential to the
national security of its homeland.""' The domestic exception grew out of
this 1951 Convention clause, and conformed to Article 33 of the UN
Protocol, the nonrefoulement obligation.11 9 It states that a Contracting
State must not expel or return a refugee to a country where his "life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership [in] a particular social group or political opinion."1 20 Article
33(2) provides an exception to that rule when "there are reasonable
grounds for regarding [the refugee] as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is."121 While this section relates to the deportation of
a refugee already within the United States, Qureshi v. Holder provides
that demonstrating eligibility for withholding of deportation is similar to
that of asylum, with the only difference being that withholding of
removal is mandatory, whereas asylum is discretionary.1 22 In this regard,
the national security exception derived from the 1951 Convention
applies to both the withholding of deportation analysis for a refugee on
the basis of a national security threat and the criteria used for denying
refugee status using the same standard.
The United States resettlement policy arguably weighs too heavily
on the side of national security, which is against the UN's
recommendation to limit measures restricting the "full enjoyment" of
human rights to only those deemed "necessary and proportional."1 23 In
fact, the United States tends to use its national security exception as a
crutch to continue discriminating against those seeking true protection.
Therefore, perhaps the appearance of the United States policy weighing
too heavily on the side of national security is not "necessary and
proportional." According to United States legal precedent defining
national security, the criteria being used to establish eligibility or
ineligibility for admission of refugees appears biased, arbitrary, and
discriminatory.
116 Rapport, supra note 2, at 211.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Yusupov v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 518 F.3d 185, 202 (3d Cir. 2008).
120 Id. at 203.
121 id.
122 Qureshi v. Holder, 422 F. App'x 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2011).
123 UNCTITF, supra note 65, at 2.
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In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court identified a clear
distinction made by Congress when an alien brought an action to
demonstrate eligibility for withholding of deportation, and argued that
the language used in the Refugee Act of 1980 that required an alien to
show that "his life would be threatened on account of [persecution] if he
was deported,"1 24 interpreted to mean that "it was more likely than not
that the alien would be subject to persecution,"1 2 5 was the same standard
the government used in applications for a grant of asylum in
demonstrating "an alien is unable or unwilling to return to his home ...
because of a well-founded fear of persecution."1 26 The Supreme Court
asserted "[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of
the statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion."1 27 In this case, the Court established that there
was a linguistic difference from the "would be threatened" language of
the removal statute and was not identical to that of the statute regarding
the admissibility of aliens section's reference to "well-founded fear of
persecution."1 28
Contrarily, in regard to the national security exception alluded to in
the removal statute and asylum statute in the Immigration and
Naturalization Service Act, an alien is statutorily ineligible for asylum
and barred from withholding of removal if there are "reasonable grounds
for regarding the alien as a danger to national security."1 29 Further, in
§ 1182-also the material support bar-Congress included language that
deemed an alien ineligible for admission if an "officer knows, or has
reasonable grounds to believe" he poses a security-related threat.130
Following the Supreme Court's interpretation in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, Congress purposely intended to include "reasonable grounds"
in every section of refugee and asylum law with regard to the national
security exception. Therefore, the interpretation of national security
exceptions must be viewed to apply to all sections of refugee law,
including the process for determining admission of a refugee located
overseas.
In interpreting the definition of national security, in In re A-H-, the
court addressed the phrase "reasonable grounds regarding the alien as a
124 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423.
125 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §1253(h) (statue has been amended to exclude this language).
126 Id. at 424; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
127 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433.
128 Id. at 431.
129 Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv).
130 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3).
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danger to [national security]."' 3 ' It considered "reasonable grounds for
regarding" as implying a reasonable person standard, 3 2 and concluded
that the "reasonable grounds for regarding" standard is satisfied if there
is information that would permit a reasonable person to believe that the
alien may pose a danger to national security.'33 However, in Yusupov v.
AG of the United States, the court rejected the In re A-H- "reasonable
grounds" meaning. 3 4 The court analyzed the phrase "is a danger" of the
clause to conclude that "is" does not mean "may," as suggested by the
formulation in In re A-H- that the national security exception is satisfied
"if there is information that would permit a reasonable person to believe
that the alien may pose a danger to the national security."' 35 The court in
Yusupov added:
This interpretation accords with neither the plain
wording nor the ordinary meaning of the statutory text,
which does not refer to belief in a mere possibility. In
other words, 'is'-and its subjunctive form 'would'-
connote a more certain determination than that the alien
'might' or 'could' be' a danger for the national security
exception to apply.13 6
Under this interpretation, the court found the statute to mean what it
says: "is" indicates that Congress intended the application of this section
to individuals who actually pose a danger to U.S. security. 3 7 It did not
intend this exception to cover aliens who conceivably could be such a
danger or have the ability to pose such a danger, adding that under this
category, "nearly anyone could fit."'38 Finally, Yusupov added that the
government must meet the threshold for establishing that an alien poses a
national security risk before concluding that a reasonable person would
believe the individual may pose a danger to national security.19 In
Malkandi v. Holder, the court confirmed this analysis and adopted it in a
review of a denial of asylum.1 4 0 The court concluded that the proper
standard was employed and the alien actually posed a danger to United
131 See In re A---H---, 2005 BIA LEXIS 11, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774 (Bd. Immigr. App.
2005).
132 Id. at 789; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II).
133 In re A-H-, 231 I. & N. Dec at 789.
134 Yusupov, 518 F.3d at 199.
135 Id. at 201.
136 id.
137 Yusupov, 518 F.3d at 202.
138 id.
139 id.
140 Malkandi, 576 F.3d at 914.
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States, and thus the national security exception was applicable.141 In
Malkandi, there was substantial evidence to support the finding that there
were reasonable grounds for regarding Malkandi as a danger to the
United States.14 2 Substantial evidence therefore supports the adverse
credibility determination, and refutes any "benefit of the doubt" given to
individuals who may lack such proof that they were not an actual
threat.1 43 By Malkandi, the government must provide "specific and
cogent reasons in support of an adverse credibility determination, after
which the court will accord the credibility determination special
deference."1 44
B. The Material Support Bar Used as a Means to Employ the
National Security Exception to Disqualify Refugees
Section 1182 provides a material support bar that allows the United
States to deny refugee status and asylum to an applicant regardless of his
or her knowledge that a group will or has committed a terrorist activity,
on the basis that he or she is affiliated with a terrorist and may be a
threat. 145 As Part II of this report alluded to, there are many Syrians who
have applied to the United States resettlement program who in fact may
meet the definition, as required by international and domestic law.
However, these qualifying refugees are limited in admission due to the
stringent requirements placed on members of particular groups. One of
the limitations is the material support bar-a standard used for the
national security exception, developed for the determination of
admissibility for refugees.1 4 6 The material support bar applies to aliens
who provide material support to an organization, with or without
knowledge of completion of threat or completion of an attack. The bar, if
satisfied, allows the government to deny protected status to the
applicant.1 47 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(A) contains a national security and
related grounds conditions for denying aliens admission.1 48 This section
bars from admission any "any alien who [an] officer . .. knows, or has
reasonable grounds to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See generally Id.
1 Malkandi, 576 F.3d at 917.
145 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
146 See Courtney Schusheim, Comment, Cruel Distinctions of the I.NA.'s Material
Support Bar, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 469, 470 (2008).
147 Jordan Fischer, Student Article, The United States and the Material Support Bar for
Refugee: A Tenuous Balance Between National Security And Basic Human Rights, 5
DREXEL L. REv. 237, 256 (2012).
148 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(A).
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solely, principally, or incidentally . . . "149 to terrorist activities which the
alien may engage, advertently or inadvertently.' The bar is extremely
broad and contains no exception, creating a heavy burden on the
admissions seeker to disprove the alleged support of terrorist activity.'
For example, the material support bar applies to refugees who gave
support, or are linked by mere affiliation or relation, to a known or
unknown member of a terrorist group. 5 2 This includes refugees who
have lived in or traveled to areas controlled by non-governmental armed
groups in order to cross into another state.'5 3 The language of the statute
encompasses the provider's past, present, and future contributions, as
well as his past, present, and future terrorist activity.154 Essentially, a
refugee may have unwillingly given support, i.e. financial, emotional,
religious, to a group in the past that has been implicated in terrorist
activity in the future. As a result, those who have "cooperated" with
terrorist organizations or members in order to flee a conflict area have
been found inadmissible under this ground. "' The statute also includes a
bar against aliens who have cooperated with a "group of two or more
individuals, whether organized or not," that engages in terrorist
activities. 5 6 This provision is synonymous to a catchall phrase intended
to encompass any support given to any subgroup of potential terrorists.
In viewing the United States' interpretation of national security
against its more stringent standard, the material support bar, it appears
that United States officers may be disqualifying refugees on an arbitrary
basis. Disqualifying refugees on the basis of the material support bar
when an alien may pose a threat is against the Court's very own
interpretation. The United States' application of the material support bar
to refugees therefore directly contributes to the UN's fear of arbitrary
denial of protection for valid asylum-seekers.5 7 As stated above,' the
UN has held that in responding to security threats, a nation must impose
limitations for the protection of national security, necessary to avert a
real and imminent-not just hypothetical-danger, 5 9 as it appears to be
administered in the U.S. for refugees of particular nationalities.
149 Schuscheim, supra note 146.
150 id.
151 Id. at 471.
152 Id. at 477.
153 id.
154 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(B).
155 Schusheim, supra note 146, at 478.
156 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(B)(vi)(III) (1980).
157 Fischer, supra note 147, at 258.
158 Id.
159 UNCTITF, supra note 65.
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Further, it has been underlined in United Nations Security Counsel
resolutions to the General Assembly that counter-terrorism efforts must
be consistent with States' obligations under international refugee, human
rights, and humanitarian law.1 6 0 Additionally, while Article IF of the
1951 Convention provides that the Convention shall not apply to persons
with regard to whom there are serious reasons for which they are
undeserving of international protection in view of the gravity of the acts
committed,16' The UNHCR further encourages States to apply these
limiting provisions regarding national security "scrupulously and
restrictively."1 62 Despite these recommendations, in In re S-K-, the U.S.
courts did not agree with the UNHCR, which urged that the material
support bar be assessed by the 1951 Convention interpretation that
requires a link between the provision of material support to a terrorist
organization and the intended use by that recipient organization of the
assistance to further a terrorist activity.1 63 The Court instead noted,
"Congress may enact statutes that conflict with international law,"1 64 and
cited United States v. Yousef' which stated "while courts are 'bound by
the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land,' Congress may
'manifest [its] will' to apply a different rule 'by passing an act for that
purpose.""1 65  Thus, the UN's suggestion to create necessary,
proportionate, and least restrictive means for achievement was
undermined by the reading in In re S-K-, which precluded consideration
of international convention obligations to the U.S.1 6 6 Contrarily, in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court acknowledged that they are guided
by the analysis set forth in the UNHCR Handbook regarding the status of
refugees.1 67 Yet the dissent in that case stated that the explanation set
forth in the Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee
status has no "force of law and in no way binds the INS."1 68 Further, the
160 S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999); S.C. Res. 1371, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1371 (Sept. 28, 2001).
161 See Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses:
Article IF of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR (Sept. 4,
2003), http://www.unhcr.org/3f7d48514.html.
162 Id.
163 In re S---K---, 2006 BIA LEXIS 11, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 944 (Bd. Immigr. App.
2006) ("We thus reject the respondent's [UNHCR] assertion that there must be a link
between the provision of material support to a terrorist organization and the intended use
by that recipient organization of the assistance to further a terrorist activity.").
164 Id. at 942.
165 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting C.J. Marshall, The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423, 3 L. Ed. 769 (1815)).
166 Schusheim, supra note 146, at 476; see generally United Nations Counter Terrorism
Task Force, supra note 65.
167 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439.
168 Id.
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Court held that § 1158, in conjunction with Article 34 of the 1951
Convention, does not require the implanting authority to actually grant
asylum to all those who are eligible, and therefore permits the United
States to use discretion in classifying persons who qualify as
"refugees."1 6 9
The UN has continuously pleaded with states to narrowly tailor
national laws to allow for the protection of national security while still
supporting the refugee programs.1 70 Yet, the Handbook, as discussed
previously, differs with the Contracting State's ability to establish the
procedure that it considers most appropriate, taking into account its
particular constitutional and administrative structure.' 7 Therefore, the
United States has continued its admissions process by using the material
support bar as its primary method to secure the national integrity of its
nation. While arguably the application to those individuals with
knowledge of-or who should have knowledge of-terrorist activities is
justified in the name of national security, application of the material
support bar to asylum and refugee applicants who do not intend to
support terrorist organizations goes too far.
PART V: DISCRETION IS DISCRIMINATION WHEN PROFILING THE
ENEMY
It follows, USCIS specially trained officers determine whether or not
a refugee is a national security threat by using the criteria established in
the material support bar under U.S. law. In ascertaining whether an alien
deserves a positive grant into the United States, the immigration
authorities must not only consider whether the applicant showed a "well-
founded fear of persecution,"1 72 but also whether the conditions in the
country of origin provide a risk of future persecution.1 73 This
determination is particularly difficult for Syrian and Iraqi refugees who
are encountering "forced displacement, violence, lack of infrastructure,
illness and lack of stability, which are not ideal conditions for preserving
formal identity documents such as passports, birth certificates, or
marriage certificates."1 7 4 In this regard, refugees face the added challenge
of preserving the documents that prove who they are, why they are
169 Id. at 441; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009).
170 Fischer, supra note 147, at 244.
171 UNHCR, supra note 32.
172 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42).
173 Harutyunyan v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
174 Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The W Visa: A Legislative Proposal for Female and
Child Refugees Trapped in A Post-September ]] World, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 459,
481 (2005).
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refugees, and that they are not involved in terrorism.17 5 This is
particularly important in trying to overcome the stringent standards
applied to them through the material support bar's excuse for the
protection of national security. As discussed, however, the 1951
Convention alluded to this issue, and the United States followed,
understanding that in particular cases, as the Handbook recommends,
unless there are good reasons to believe the contrary, the individual
should be given the benefit of the doubt.1 7 6 Thereby, while the burden of
proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and
evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the
examiner. 7 7 In some cases it is therefore necessary for the examiner to
use all the means at his disposal, including credibility assessments, to
produce the necessary evidence in support of the application.7 s The issue
is whether or not specialized officers are in fact adhering to these
practices.
FBI Director James Comey was quoted during the proposal of the
American SAFE Act: "with a conflict zone like Syria, where there is
'dramatically' less information available to use during the vetting
process, he could not 'offer anybody an absolute assurance that there is
no risk associated with' admitting Syrian nationals as refugees."1 79 Yet,
in viewing the statistics provided in Part III, Director Comey's comments
confirm the practice of immigration officers regarding these refugees.
While the explanation for the decrease in admissions is arguably the
rigorous process for screening, an approximate 85,000-drop from the
Iraqi resettlement program (during the peak of the War on Terror) to the
program intended to resettle the Syrian refugees cannot be explained
solely on a lengthy and stringent process. Since 2013, the UNHCR has
referred 32,369 Syrian refugees to the United States for resettlement
consideration. so From those, the United States has processed and
resettled only 2,486.8 While the screening process may last several
years before a refugee gains protection within the United States, this
report proposes that given the current administration's authorization to
175 Id.
176 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102; see also UNHCR, supra
note 32, at 39.
177 UNHCR, supra note 32, at 38.
178 Id.; see also Malkandi, 576 F.3d at 917.
179 161 CONG. REc. 171, H8381 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2015) (statement by Rep. Goodlatte
quoting FBI Director James Comey).
180 Resettlement and Other Forms of Legal Admission for Syrian Refugees, UNHCR
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.pdf.
REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR, supra note 110.
2015-16] 83
84 U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV
accept 70,000 refugees-10,000 Syrian,182 where 22,427 of four
million 83 have been referred the United States, with acceptance of
2,365,184 these USCIS officers have not only abused their discretion by
continuously engaging in discriminatory practices in determining the
status of refugees, but they have also abandoned U.S. precedent.
Qureshi v. Holder provided that the only difference between
withholding of removal and an application for asylum or refugee status is
that removal is mandatory, while asylum is discretionary. Immigration
officers conduct detailed in-person interviews with refugee applicants for
the determination of admission. 8 6 Given their discretion, not only have
these officers engaged in arbitrary practices for admitting refugees into
the United States, but they have also hidden these denials behind the
national security exception. The decrease in admissions of refugees may
have a number of explanations. However, this report proposes that given
the many specialized screening processes targeted at Syrian and Iraqi
nationals, the latest American SAFE Act, along with the American
population's strong opposition to accepting Syrian refugees into the
United States,8 7 leads to an inherent discriminatory bias with the
national security exception as its loophole.
The consistent practice of the USCIS officers resembles that of
profiling. Profiling is generally defined as the systematic association of
sets of physical, behavioral or psychological characteristics with
particular offenses and their use as a basis for making law enforcement
decisions."s The use of profiling constitutes disproportionate
interferences with human rights and violates the principle of non-
discrimination. 8 9 Both the ICCPR and the 1951 Convention are widely
accepted either as binding treaty law or customary international law. The
United States is a party to both conventions, and must therefore adhere to
its obligations regarding derogation of rights, which shall be
accomplished in a non-discriminatory manner.' 90 In addition, the 1951
182 Presidential Memorandum -- FY 2015 Refugee Admissions, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 30,
2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/presidential-memorandu
m-fy-2015-refugee-admissions.
183 Bixler & Martinez, supra note 13, at 15.
184 Schusheim, supra note 146.
185 See Qurseshi v. Holder, 422 F. App'x 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2011).
186 Hearing, supra note 77, at 9.
1s7 Margaret Talev, Most Americans Oppose Syrian Refugee Resettlement, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-11-18/bloomberg-
poll-most-americans-oppose-syrian-refugee-resettlement (53% of Americans opposed to
accepting Syrian refugees).
188 UNCTITF, supra note 65, at 8.
189 Id.
190 ICCPR, supra note 70, ch. 4.
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Convention clearly and unequivocally requires member states to "apply
the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to
race, religion or country of origin."' 9 ' Profiling by immigration officers
and the United States Congress, based on ethnic and national origin,
country of origin, or religion is an immoral violation of international
law.1 9 2 Clearly, the United States has abandoned its international
obligations to humanitarian law, refugee law, and Treaties, and has
violated the oldest known principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements
must be kept).' 93 Such profiling and discrimination has broken ties with
many of its allies. If the United States wishes to hold strong ties with its
allies in the War on Terror, "it must stand by its values of freedom and
make sure these values extend to those who are persecuted by the same
individuals or groups who have created the necessity for a war against
terrorism."1 94
PART VI: DISCRIMINATION PROMOTES THREATS TO NATIONAL
SECURITY; OPENING BORDERS UNDERMINES IT
The United States has historically engaged in discriminatory
practices to secure the nation's integrity. During World War II, the
United States implemented a policy for limiting Jewish refugees because
of anti-Semitism influence and fear of Nazism.1 9 5 Additionally, the U.S.
historical detention of thousands of Japanese-Americans in internment
camps demonstrates that the U.S. has long feared the enemy planting
agents, spies and saboteurs among the refugees or pressuring refugees to
act on their behalf."1 9 6
After the attack in 2001, where the hijackers entered the United
States through the immigration system,1 9 7 the United States prepared its
forces to defeat al-Qaeda by adapting its military, intelligence, and law
enforcement agencies to the tasks of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency against al-Qaeda operatives.1 However, IS is a
191 G.A. Res. 429(V), supra note 30, art. 3.
192 UNCTITF, supra note 65.
193 Encyclopedia Britannica, pacta sunt servanda (last visited Apr. 10, 2016)
http://www.britannica.com/topic/pacta-sunt-servanda (defining pacta sunt servanda).
194 Malik, supra note 69, at 341.
195 See generally Adam Geller, Refugee Refusal Today Compared, Contrasted to That
of WWII, Assoc. PRESS (Nov. 20, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fdble7c23744e
1 f869299be47fcb56d/refugee-refusal-today-compared-contrasted-wwii.
196 d.
197 Martha Raddatz, State Dept. Lapses Aided 911 Hijackers, ABC NEWS (last visited
Apr. 10, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1 30051.
198 Audrey Kurth Cronin, ISIS: Is Not a Terrorist Group, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Mar./Apr.
2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group.
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different group; IS is not al-Qaeda.' 99 Al-Qaeda's primary enemy is the
United States. 2 00 The primary target of IS has not been the United States,
but the apostate regimes in the Arab world.20 ' IS maintains its focus on
Iraq and Syria, and to a lesser degree on other states in the Muslim
world.202 While the actions of IS may inspire homegrown terror in the
United States, IS has not directed its resources to attack it.2 03 Regarding
the recent Paris attach by IS, while proposals of IS infiltration among the
European refugees have been introduced, such a position is contrary to
IS' strategic goals.204
A backlash against the refugee population serves the interests of IS
because fleeing refugees weaken the idealistic image IS intends to
introduce. 205 Leaving IS territory does not promote a "refuge" as IS
claims, but rather, a land to seek refuge from.206 IS warns that these
fleeing refugees will only find happiness in the IS caliphate. Therefore,
when refugees are denied and mistreated, this furthers IS legitimacy,207
and the U.S. instead lays ground for recruiting among the refugees.208
Therefore, "[w]elcoming immigrants, isn't just a moral act-it's smart
counterterrorism." 209
A return to the Cold War foreign-based policy has been considered
as a mechanism for advancement of the U.S. position.210 However, it has
been countered that such a policy would not function as well as it once
did because the War on Terror is not a war against theocratic
governments, but instead one against terrorist organizations that consist
of individuals not affiliated with any particular form of government. 2 11
This may have been true in the war against al-Qaeda, which gained
support from varying operatives by using mechanisms of attack to
199 d.
200 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,
BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD, (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-
state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf.
201 Id. at Part I.
202 Byman, supra note 24.
203 id.
204 Zack Beauchamp, Turning Back Syrian Refugees Isn't Just Wrong-It Helps ISIS,
VOXWORLD, (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.vox.com/world/2015/11/17/9747042/paris-
attacks-isis-reftigees.
205 id.
206 id.
207 id.
208 id.
209 id.
210 Brower, supra note 74, at 580.
211 Id.
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eliminate U.S. support from the region.2 12 Here, IS has already declared a
caliphate within the territory under its control. 213 This particular
government includes institutions in the territory that are affiliated with an
ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim rule.2 14
If the United States government must continue a self-serving policy,
they must use it to their advantage, and just as in the foreign policy
directed at refugees during the Cold War, they must accept Syrian
refugees as they do all other nationalities. In accepting refugees, the U.S.
turns IS's mission against them by undermining their legitimacy, and
also follows correct precedent and its international obligations. This
policy will lend support to the belief that the IS caliphate is not in
accordance with true Islam2 15 and follow a campaign of "psychological
warfare" against IS and its leadership. If IS is truly the cause of the
United States' greatest fear of accepting refugees, it is necessary for the
U.S. to consider options not only beneficial to their national security, but
also to consider those that are consistent with universal human rights. As
during the Cold War, the purpose was to advance U.S. foreign policy
objectives in a manner that would validate communist-based countries'
failure.2 16 Here, in granting admission to refugees fleeing IS controlled
territory, the U.S. will demonstrate that IS is an oppressive persecutor
and instead further its appeal against IS claims,217 while at the same time
admonishing IS recruiting grounds among the refugees.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of asylum and refugee law is to continue the tradition of
providing the oppressed with opportunities to settle in the United States.
Yet, the current system is arguably ill-equipped to accomplish this task.
The laws created by the legislature have displaced humanitarian concerns
in favor of self-serving practices. In reality, such practices provide the
United States government with another tool for making cruel distinctions
that keep genuine refugees from being granted status or sanctuary.
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Regardless of the establishment of a foreign-based policy that may
advance counter-terrorism efforts against IS, the United States is failing
in its obligations to international law and to its own domestic law. By the
definitions established in the 1951 Convention and domestic law,
terrorists fleeing Syria and Iraq attempt to escape a "pattern and practice"
of unavoidable persecution premised on discriminatory and protected
grounds. 218 Government forces on one end and terrorists on the other end
continue to implement such violence. 21 9 Each applicant arguably satisfies
the definition required by the UNHCR and the United States to become a
refugee. The United States has an obligation to follow the treaties that it
has ratified, which demand non-discriminatory practices in determining
eligibility for refugee status. The United States cannot send its
immigration officers to conduct interviews with these applicants and use
"loopholes" to argue inadmissibility on the basis of national security
when the exceptions are being applied arbitrarily. It is uncanny that the
disparate numbers in admissions into the United States, compared to
those that have been referred, are a result of long processing times.
Instead, the problem falls upon immigration officers' discretion in
admitting or denying applicants on the basis of these possible national
security concerns. Under the definition the United States has provided,
immigration officers must conclude that there is sufficient evidence to
establish that such applicants may pose a threat to the security of the
United States, and then determine through further investigation whether
they are actually a threat to national security.
The twenty-first century has seen some staggering changes; once
standing as the leader in humanitarian efforts for the rights of man, the
United States now stands aside, shaking the weight of the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world off their shoulders. Instead, the home of
the historical genocide that once shocked the conscience of humanity has
become the model for human rights and frontrunner in the Syrian exodus.
Germany has consistently maintained a resettlement success rate for
Syrian refugees at 93.2 percent. 220 Representative Conyers made it very
clear in his rejection of the unreasonable proposal of halting the
resettlement program for Syrian and Iraqi nationals: "Rather than
shutting our doors to these desperate men and women and children who
are risking their lives to escape death and torture in their own homelands,
we should work to utilize our immense resources and good intentions of
218 Poushter, supra note 215, at 93.
219 Id. at Part I.
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VIEW (Nov. 17, 2015), available at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-
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our citizens to welcome them." 2 2 1 Perhaps fear is a stronger emotion than
compassion, yet when fear is multiplied by four million Syrian refugees,
human rights must remain sacrosanct.222
221 Cong. Rec. H 8381, supra note 109.
222 Gilbert, supra note 4.
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